(PRINT) Name:	Student No.:		
Signature:	Tutorial room	Total Mark:	/25
CSC 200-	—Social and Economic N Quiz 3, November 13, 2015	letworks	
Answer all questions on both side sheet of <i>handwritten</i> notes. No other in			" by 11"
Time: 20 minutes; Total Marks: 2	5		
1. (15 points) For each of the following provide			
• There is <i>no</i> pure Nash Equ	uilibrium (PNE). Very briefly (e.g	g. one sentence) explain answ	ver.
SOLUTION: The matchin	ng pennies game (see slide 21 of I	Lecture 9) has no pure NE.	
• There is a unique PNE. Is	this PNE Pareto optimal? Is it a s	social optimum?	
(A, A). This NE is a solu	er, 3 action game on slide 13 of tion optimum and hence must be me (see slide 16 in Lecture 10) vo optimal.	Pareto optimal. Another ex	ample is
• There are at least two PN social optimum?	NE. Which of the PNE are Pareto	o optimal? Which of the PN	NE are a
pure NE (Uptown, Uptow	nced coordination game (slide 17 m) is socially optimal and Pareto ially optimal nor Pareto optimal.		

2. (10 points) For each of the following, answer true or false and provide a very brief (e.g. one sentence) explanation.		
• In a two agent game, if one agent has a dominant strategy then there must be a PNE.		
SOLUTION: Yes there must be a pure NE. If say player 1 has a dominant strategy A , then player 2 can move to whatever strategy B will maximize the payoff of state (A, B) ; this state (A, B) is then a pure NE.		
 In a three agent game, if one agent has a dominant strategy then there must be a PNE. 		
in a timee agent game, it one agent has a dominant stategy attentation that de a 1112.		
SOLUTION: No, there need not be a Pure NE. Player 3 might have a dominant strategy C which then results in a submatrix (such as the matching pennies matrix) which has no pure NE.		